Israel, Hamas, and the Ethics of War

>> Peter Berkowitz: We should never confuse acts of terrorism and the acts of a rights-protecting democracy that seeks to defend itself. Yes, thank you.

>> Speaker 2: Thank you very much for your lecture this afternoon. My name is Josiah Linebach from Hillsdale College, where we have a military history program.

 

>> Peter Berkowitz: Yes, you do. A second noble exception to the rule.

>> Speaker 2: Yes, thank you. Given that we are 10 months or so into this war and Israel's war aims to destroy Hamas, they've encountered a lot of difficulties in reaching that point this long in. How realistic are those war aims?

 

Still, without engaging in the sort of counterinsurgency tactics that will draw in other nations and related to that point, we will continuing to pursue those war aims weaken Israel in the event that a broader war does break out in the north with Hezbollah or perhaps also with Iran.

 

 

>> Peter Berkowitz: So let's. Good question. Let me refine or say something about the official war aims. Destroying Hamas capacity to govern and to wage war is not equivalent to destroying Hamas. Hamas is a powerful force in the West Bank, Judea and Samaria, but it can't wage war and it doesn't govern, so the best case scenario, and this is not made clear, I agree.

 

By many of Israel's leaders, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, accomplishing the war aim would mean that Israel, for the foreseeable future, would be engaged in counter terrorism, counterterrorism, counterterrorism operations for the foreseeable future. Israel plans on maintaining security control over the wider Gaza Strip and finding ways to transfer civilian administration to local Palestinians.

 

But, so you're quite right about that. But that notion is already built into the idea. The best you can reasonably hope for is. And their ability to wage war and govern, you can't destroy them entirely, impart their ideology. They live to a certain extent in the hearts and minds of many Palestinians.

 

Okay, second, the Israelis have reached a point where major military operations have ended in Gaza. Right now, they're relying upon intelligence for targeted operations. So it's not so much the ongoing activities every day that are weakening Israel and that might interfere with a proper defense in a wider regional war.

 

It's the entirety of the previous 10 months. Remember, in Israel, military service is mandatory, roughly three years for men, two years for women. And if you're an officer, many soldiers in combat units continue to serve in the reserves up until the age of. It varies, late 30s, early 40s.

 

A big part of Israel's fighting army is composed of reserves. Those people are exhausted. They've been taken away from their families, from. From their jobs. The young people are exhausted. The society is still traumatized from the massacres. So all this weighs on military planners as they're thinking about the possibility of a wider war.

 

So is this a serious problem for the Israelis? Yes. Can they overcome it? I suspect so most Israelis understand right now I think this is not properly sunk in elsewhere that they are right now in a fight for their survival. Necessity provides you with energy and fortitude that you may not have known that you've had.

 

But the bottom line is, yes, the Israelis face many hard days and months and maybe years ahead.

>> Speaker 3: A highly linked question, but looking a little bit more into the future. You kind of just discussed then that Israel is essentially looking to eventually transition to from security control of the Gaza Strip to civilian control by the Palestinians.

 

How might that occur? Do you think Israel is going to have to reoccupy Gaza like they did in 2005? Or I suppose they ceded control in 2005? Or do you think Egypt might occupy Gaza? How might you have the transition from Hamas control in Gaza to a more civilian-oriented Palestinian control?

 

 

>> Peter Berkowitz: It's a good question. And since the end of my title is the day after, and I haven't really touched on that, I'm glad you asked the question so I can make good on the bargain. When I talk about Israel, I'm often compelled to repeat a piece of wisdom I heard from an old friend many years ago said in order to understand Middle east politics, you have to deeply internalize three axioms.

 

One, all options are bad. Two, it's not reasonable to assume, as we often do in public policy analysis, that we will be able to identify some one option that is less bad than all the others. And three, unlike the stark logic of politics everywhere else, the enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend.

 

Okay, internalize that. And now, in connection to Gaza today, one modification I began with. All options are bad. In regard to the day after in Gaza, all options are terrible. Terrible. So it is not an objection to a proposal to say that it's terrible. That's the class you're dealing with.

 

Now, having said that, there are three basic possibilities for Gaza the day after. And by the way, it's not that Israel will reoccupy Gaza. Israel has already reoccupied Gaza. Israel has a complete military. Well, Israel has military control of Gaza, it is an occupying power right now. What are the three basic options?

 

The three basic options are that Arab regimes in the neighborhood take responsibility for the security and administration of the Gaza Strip, terrible option. They're not good at that sort of thing. They won't do what the Israelis could do. They won't take losses. They have no experience. What little experience they have has not ended well.

 

So Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, they don't want to do it, but it's a terrible option. The second option that people have talked about Palestinians; in the first case, the Palestinian Authority. But the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank is weak, sclerotic, and corrupt. It can't actually rule the Gaza Strip without the cooperation of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Shabak internal security, operating every night to protect it from Hamas.

 

The Palestinian Authority can't rule the West Bank, how's it going to rule the Gaza Strip? That's a terrible option. The third option is maybe this is what you meant by reoccupy Israel ruling the Gaza Strip. Terrible option. Why would Israel want to rule another 2, 2 and a half, 2.3 million Palestinians who don't want to be ruled by them?

 

Those are the three basic options. All terrible. Which do we choose? Actually, we choose an option that is a combination of all three. What do I mean? Funds will have to come from the Emirates, from Saudi Arabia, from, from elsewhere to help with the massive job of reconstructing the Gaza Strip.

 

Israel for a long time will maintain overall security control for the Gaza Strip, policing the entrance of goods and services and people from Egypt, from the Mediterranean along the Israeli border. And three, Israel and its partners, the United States, other Arab countries will have to do their best to find local Palestinians, preferably Gazans with as weak ties as possible to Hamas, to be responsible for Gaza administration.

 

Now you could say, well, that's taking from each of the three terrible options. Why won't that be three times as terrible? Because we're trying to take the least terrible part of each of the three terrible options, bring them together. So planning has begun. In my opinion, not enough planning has been done on that.

 

But my guess is the day after as we reached it, now that we've reached it, will increasingly look like the mess, the mess that I just described. Question up here.

>> Speaker 4: I might have a question. My name is Max, I'm from Denmark and thank you so much for this lecture.

 

My question is regarding the ICC and the arrest warrant on the leader of Israel. What's your opinion on that? And how should the US act according to this arrest like potential arrest warrant.

>> Peter Berkowitz: My opinion is that the request for warrants for the rest of Benjamin Netanyahu are outrageous.

 

Further evidence that the ICJ is not a court but a political den of iniquity and that the United States should do what it can to make Clear that this is in its eyes and illegitimate. I've seen. In order to responsibly accuse Benjamin Netanyahu of war crimes, you would at minimum need access to Israel's rules of engagement.

 

As far as I'm aware, the prosecutor for the ICJ is. Does not have access to those rules of engagement. Moreover, I add this, it is unprecedented in warfare, ancient or modern, for an army to do what Israel has done before. Every attack in every region of Gaza. It drops hundreds of thousands of leaflets.

 

It sends hundreds of thousands of text messages. It asks people to leave. Hamas then threatens the people who leave with death. We should never confuse acts of terrorism and the acts of a rights protecting democracy that seeks to defend itself. Now, I'm not going to stand here and attempt to defend every single action Israel has undertaken in this war.

 

In war, as in all human activities, always there will be mistakes. I'm sure there are occasions in which Israel has gone over the line because armies always go over the line. But I'm also sure that by any comparative measure with armies in even vaguely similar circumstances, Israel has taken unprecedented measures to to protect civilians populations, while Hamas has taken almost unprecedented measures to expose its own civilians to death and destruction.

 

 

>> Speaker 5: Hi, Dr. Berkowitz. My name is Thomas. You had mentioned the Saudis a few times.

>> Peter Berkowitz: Yes.

>> Speaker 5: And I was wondering what role Saudi Arabia might play in a possible ceasefire agreement or normalization between themselves and Israel and what role the US will also play in that.

 

 

>> Peter Berkowitz: Big, another big. Another important question, which I have to answer in about 60 seconds. Saudi Arabia behind the scenes played a big role in the Abraham Accords. It had to give a green light, or at least a flashing yellow light to the Emirates in Bahrain for that to take place.

 

The Saudis made clear in 2022 that they're interested in entering into the Abraham Accords recognizing normalizing relations with Israel. The October 7th attacks have greatly complicated matters for the Saudis. The Saudis have made clear for over a year now, well, certainly since October 7th, no, for, let's say, a year and a half, that in order for them to proceed normalizing relations with Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu would have to signal some readiness to promote Palestinian Greater Palestinian autonomy in the direction of a Palestinian state.

 

Given Netanyahu's coalition, it is extremely unlikely that Netanyahu can send those necessary signals. Even though Benjamin Netanyahu knows how to do this. I remind you because in 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu became the first Israeli Prime Minister to recognize the validity of a Palestinian state at his Bar Ilan speech in the late spring, early summer of 2009.

 

Lot more to say about this. Happy to discuss things later, but I can see that Josh wants me to end, so I will end. Thank you.